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IBSEC-CSS-M-63
13 October 1972

COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting
Held at CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia
13 October 1972

1. The sixty-third meeting of the Computer Security Subcommittee of the United States Intelligence Board Security Committee was held on 13 October 1972 between 0930 and 1145 hours in Room 4E-64 Headquarters Building. In attendance were:

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Mr. Terence J. Shea, State Member

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Major John C. Karp, Army Member
Mr. Robert B. Cameron, Navy Member

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Captain Frederick R. Tucker, Air Force Member

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Mr. John H. Skaggs, FBI Alternate
Mr. Raymond J. Brady, AEC Member

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Mr. James Mastrovito, Treasury/USSS Observer

STAT

Mr. Frank M. Machak, State

STAT

Major Garry G. Miller, Army

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2. The security level of this meeting was announced as Top Secret COMINT.

3. Approval of Minutes: The minutes of the 21 July 1972 Subcommittee Meeting (M-62) were approved without change.

4. Proposed Upgrading of COINS Network: The Chairman introduced discussion of this agenda item by providing the background of the proposal and detailing the tasking action received from the Acting Chairman of the Security Committee. He acknowledged the requirements for eventually permitting the introduction of TK material into the COINS network operation. He noted the July 1972 proposal of the COINS Project Manager to accomplish the introduction of such material by upgrading the security level of COINS to TOP SECRET SI/TK by raising the individual subsystems of the network in one of the following fashions:

    a. Securing a subsystem totally to the SI/TK level;

    b. Approving the operation of individual subsystem for multi-level operation under the provisions of DCID No. 1/16.

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The Chairman also reminded members of the DIA proposal at the August 1972 USIB/IHC Meeting to simply upgrade the entire network operation to the SI/TK level.

5. The Chairman explained that the USIB/IHC had considered the DIA proposal, had initially planned to direct the COINS Project Manager to identify problems involved in the proposal and seemed prepared to develop a schedule for its implementation. At the suggestion of USIB/IHC members, the Chairman of this Committee decided to refer a study of the security implications of the proposal to the Security Committee. The Acting Chairman of the Security Committee in turn referred action on the IHC request to the Computer Security Subcommittee; a copy of the referral memorandum is attached.

6. In view of the request for expeditious handling of the CSS action on this matter and the fact that security evaluation of the proposal is being requested, the Chairman announced that he did not intend to handle this agenda item as a Community-coordinated action, but only as a Subcommittee effort.

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8. The problems associated with the upgrading proposal were the basis for extended discussion at the instant meeting. Among the specific difficulties cited were:

a. Except for CIA (including NPIC) there exist considerable administrative problems in

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meeting the personnel and physical security
requirements associated with securing the
entire network to the TK level. These problems
involve the access approval of large numbers of
personnel for TK material and upgrading the
physical security protection of terminal and other
areas. These problems may be especially great
in the IDHS environment which may have terminal
sites not secured to the TS/SI level;

    b. The justification for access approving
large numbers of people for TK material for
administrative reasons is questionable;

    c. Especially in view of the DIAOLS Test
results and the presumption that other subsystems
in the network and particularly those in the IDHS
environment may be analogously vulnerable,
prudence suggests against increasing quantitatively
or qualitatively the risk of continued COINS opera-
tion;

    d. The COINS charter is void of any agree-
ment or authority by which the size of the network
can be limited. In this regard, it also acknowledged
that individual COINS participants could extend
COINS access to other components of their individual
organizations without obtaining unanimous approval
of COINS participants.

9. Because of the problem cited above and other issues
mentioned in the Subcommittee discussion, there was unanimous
agreement among members that it would be impossible and/or
very unwise to upgrade the security level of COINS to include
TK material over the near term, i.e., for at least one year.

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10. The Subcommittee acknowledged the long term require-
ment for processing TK material in COINS, assuming the network
requirement itself warrants continued development. The Sub-
committee further recognized that network security is paramount
and poses enormous difficulties to the upgrading proposal and in-
deed to the continued operation of the network at its current security
level. The Subcommittee expressed a desire to respond to its
tasking for guidance and the recommendations by defining alterna-
tives for resolving the security difficulties involved in terms of the
intermediate and long range development of the network. One such
alternative mentioned in the discussion was the fact that the
security problems would pose a lesser risk and be decreased by a
dimension if the intersection of COINS and the IDHS environment
could be separated or buffered. By such a separation COINS would
be limited to its basic DIA, NSA, and NPIC subsystems and the
DIA switch; it might also accommodate a CIA subsystem, if such
were considered desirable at a later date. This alternative would
constrain COINS participants from extending COINS access to other
systems directly.

11. The NSA and DIA Subcommittee members noted their
plans for visiting the FICPAC and CONAD/NORAD installations
between 24 October and 1 November with reference to the handling
of compartmented intelligence in these ADP systems and the
involvement of these systems in COINS. In view of the Subcommittee
tasking re the proposed upgrading of the network, the possibility of
the CSS Chairman accompanying these DIA and NSA representatives
was mentioned.

12. Except for Subcommittee agreement that any upgrading
of COINS was impossible and/or unwise, no firm conclusions were
reached in the instant meeting. Members expressed a desire to
consult with appropriate personnel in their separate organizations
in light of the discussions at the instant meeting, and to continue
discussion of the proposal at the next meeting.

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b.   TK access approval: Noting the fact that
Subcommittee meetings in the past have been limited
to the TOP SECRET COMINT level, and particularly
in view of the Subcommittee tasking on the COINS
proposal, the Chairman announced his intention to
solicit authorization for TK access approvals for all
Subcommittee members and alternates, hopefully by
the next meeting;

c.   Automated fingerprint classification:
The NSA representative mentioned during the meeting
that he had heard of a developmental effort being
undertaken by the FBI to automate the reading and
classification of fingerprints; he brought it to Sub-

committee attention in view of the possible
application of such techniques as a method
of user identification.

At the request of the Chairman the
FBI representative will determine whether
a briefing on this developmental effort might
be provided the Subcommittee and possibly
the Security Committee itself. Broader
interest in this project would be based on
Community concern for improvement of
personnel identification mechanisms not only
for computer users, but to enhance access
control techniques;

d. New monolithic memories:
Also during the meeting the NSA representa-
tive called to Subcommittee attention recent
discoveries that certain properties of new
monolithic memories pose problems in the
application of overwrite techniques. At the
Chairman's request the NSA representative
will prepare a paper for Subcommittee
dissemination describing the problems involved;

e. Possible briefing by Strategic Air
Command: Citing the 19 July 1972 meeting of the
IHC System Design and Development Sub-
committee, the Chairman noted that the SD&DS
is investigating the possibility of a joint briefing
with the CSS by SAC representatives on the
approach being taken by SAC to the multi-level
security problem, including its establishment of
an ADP Security Officer. The Subcommittee
deferred to the SD&DS the decision on the desir-
ability of such a joint briefing depending on
further research by SD&DS.

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